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THE IMPROVEMENT OF WATER AND WATER-DEPENDENT 
RESOURCES UNDER THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER ANNEX 
Sandra Zellmer, David Gecas and Kori Anne ~ a n n '  
I .  INTRODUCTION 
In 1985, the eight Great Lakes Governors and the Premiers of Ontario and 
Quebec signed the Great Lakes Charter, a nonbinding agreement for managing 
Great Lakes water reso~rces.~ The overarching objectives of the Charter are "to 
protect and conserve the [water] levels and flows . . . [and] the environmental 
balance of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" while also "provid[ing] a secure 
foundation for future investment and development within the region" through 
cooperative management.3 
Principle IV of the Charter declared the signatories' intent with respect to 
diversions of water from the Basin: 
No Great Lakes State or Province will approve or permit any major new 
or increased diversion or consumptive use of Great Lakes water without 
the consent and concurrence of all affected Great Lakes States and 
~rov inces .~  
For the most part, the Charter, along with the federal Water Resources 
Development Act of 1986' and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909,~ have been 
sufficient to serve the needs of this temperate region, where water shortages and 
disputes over water management are relatively rare. In 1998, however, the Nova 
Group of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario proposed to export approximately 159 million 
gallons of water annually from the Great Lakes to Asia. The Nova proposal was 
'~andra  Zellmer is an associate professor at the University of Toledo College of Law and facuity 
member of the Legal Institute of the Great Lakes. David Gecas and Kori Anne Mann are J.D. 
Candidates, University of Toledo College of Law. The authors thank Dean Phil Closius and the 
College of Law for their generous research support. 
2 ~ h e  Great Lakes Charter, Feb. 11, 1985 (visited Dec. 14,2002) <http://www.cglg.org/pub/charter/ 
index.html>. 
j~d. 
4 Id. at Principle 4. 
*water Resources Development Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. 51962d-20 (amended 2000). 
6 See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Arl. 111, Jan. 
11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (generally requiring International Joint Commission approval of use, 
diversion, or obstruction of boundary waters if levels or flows on the other side of the boundary are 
affected). 
'~nternational Joint Comm'n, Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes: Final Report to the 
Governments of Canada and the United States $ 10 1 13 (Feb. 22,2000) (visited Nov. 8, 2002) 
Published in Toledo Journal of Great Lakes' Law, Science and Policy, vol. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 289-310. 
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highly controversial, and it prompted a re-examination of Great Lakes water 
management policies. 
Against this backdrop, the Governors 'and Premiers signed a supplementary 
agreement to the Charter on June 18, 2001.~ This agreement, known as the 
Annex or Annex 2001, established principles for a new decision making 
framework for reviewing proposed withdrawals of Great Lakes water. Annex 
2001 is the first step toward a set of binding water management agreements to be 
negotiated by June 2004.~ 
Directive 3 of the Annex provides that proposals to withdraw water will not be 
approved unless they will produce "an improvement to the waters and water 
dependent natural resources of the Great Lakes   as in."" The Annex uses the 
term "improvement" with reference to ecosystem integrity rather than economic 
or other societal values." Related themes are found in a variety of international, 
federal and state laws, but few if any provisions require ecosystem improvement 
as an explicit end goal. 
In a modest attempt to further define this standard, this paper will review 
existing statutes and regulations in search of analogous legal requirements. Our 
assessment is intended to provide some initial direction and guidance for the 
interested public and for decision-makers faced with the task of implementing the 
improvement standard. As the scope of our endeavor is limited to existing law, 
we must leave it for ecologists and experts from other disciplines to establish 
clear, quantifiable goals and measurements to ensure that the improvement 
standard is articulated and met.12 
In order to limit our inquiry to laws that were most on point, and therefore 
most likely to provide meaningful guidance, we rejected several possible legal 
analogues when we began this assessment. First, sustainability and sustainable 
development is a common theme of a variety of international environmental 
agreements.13 Federal forestry and public land management statutes also direct 
~http://www.ijc.org/ijcweb-e.html>; Gary Ballesteros, Great Lakes Water Exports and Diversions: 
Annex 2001 and the Looming Environmental Battle, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 1061 1 (2002). 
'see Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Water Management Governance (visited Nov. 
8,2002) <http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/>. 
9 ~ d .  Once completed, binding agreements would have to be approved by the appropriate State and 
Provincial legislatures before they become legally binding. In addition, Congress must approve 
binding compacts among the States. See U.S. Const. art. I, 5 10; Suzanne Zazych, Compact = 
Contract, LakeLinks (Newsletter of the Legal Institute of the Great Lakes) (Spring/Summer 2002). 
10 Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter, Directive 
#3, June 18,2001 (visited Dec. 13,2002) ~http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/Annex2OOl.pdD. 
11 Id. at 3. See infra Section 11. 
I2~urther efinement of the improvement standard will require multi-disciplinary efforts, such as 
that being undertaken by the Great Lakes Commission in developing a Water Resources 
Management Decision Support System, which will include annual water use inventories and 
ecological evaluations of the Great Lakes system. See Water Resources Management Decision 
Support System (visited Jan. 3 1, 2003) <http://www.glc.org/wateruse>. See also Jeffrey E. 
Edstrom, et al., An Approach for Identifiing Improvements under the Great Lakes Charter Annex 
200f,4 J .  Great Lakes' L. Sci. & Policy 335 (2002). 
I3see Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/15 1 /5 /~ev .  1, 3 1 
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that natural resources be utilized in a sustainable fashion.I4 The concept turns on 
providing sustained yields of various resource outputs, however, and while it 
may promote conservation of resources, it does not require ecosystem 
improvement. 
Similarly, provisions of certain federal ollution control statutes are somewhat 
I? analogous, but are not directly on point. The Clean Air Act requires that new 
sources obtain offsets, or reductions in air pollutants, before commencing 
construction in areas that do not attain national ambient air quality standards.'" 
The Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA or Superfund) requires restoration of natural resources, such as 
fisheries, damaged by the release of hazardous substances.I7 Yet neither of these 
regulatory programs includes ecosystem improvement as a requirement of permit 
or project approval or clean-up efforts. 
We ultimately selected provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) for detailed analysis, as they appeared to be the 
most analogous to "improvement" as the term is utilized in Annex 2001. 
Particular emphasis is given to the requirements associated with two permit 
programs: (1) "Incidental Take Permits" (ITPs) issued by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
under ESA $10, '~ and (2) CWA $ 404 permits, issued by the Army Corps of 
Engineers for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable waters, 
including wetlands.19 
ESA 8 10 requires a habitat conservation plan before an entity may obtain an 
ITP for a project that might "take" a member of a protected species.20 
Conservation plans typically include long-term ecosystem protection and 
restoration  measure^.^' Such measures could be considered improvements over 
baseline conditions at the time of project implementation. 
CWA $ 404 requires avoidance or mitigation of losses to wetlands caused by 
dredging or filling in the course of development and other a~ t i v i t i e s .~~  Wetlands 
I.L.M. 874 (1992), and Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 151.26 (1992) (calling for development 
that maximizes human potential while protecting the environment); Convention on Biological 
Diversity Art. 6(a), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (committing members 
to "develop national strategies for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity"). 
I4see ~ a t i o n a l  Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601(d), 1604(g) (1999); Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §$ 1712(c)(l), 1732(a) (1995). 
"see Resource Improvement Standard Briejlng Paper to the Great Lakes Commission (visited Oct. 
11, 2002) < h t t p : / / w w w . g l c . o r g / w a t e ~ s e / p d f / B r i e f i n  (providing case studies 
of various federal and state programs that utilize concepts similar to "improvement"). 
1642 U.S.C. 7503(c) (1997). 
1742 U.S.C. 4 9607(f) (1997). 
''16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(2) (1999). 
19 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001). 
2016 U.S.C. 5 1539(a)(2) (1999). 
2 1 ~ e e  U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species 
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook 1-1 5,3-20 (1 996). 
22 33 U.S.C. 4 1344(a). See 40 C.F.R. 5 230.10 (2002). 
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restoration or "banking" may be required in order to obtain a 404 permit. 
Requirements for on-site restoration, in particular, may be comparable to an 
improvement standard. Wetlands banking could also improve environmental 
conditions by requiring a net gain of quantity and overall quality of wetlands, and 
by creating and maintaining relatively large wetland parcels to replace smaller 
wetland areas lost to development.23 
We begin in Section I1 by defining the word "improvement" as it is used in the 
Annex. This is followed by a discussion of the overarching goals of the ESA and 
its key provisions in Section 111. We then draw analogies between the ITP 
mitigation requirements and the improvement standard by assessing agency 
interpretations and judicial challenges with respect to the ITP permitting process. 
Section IV compares the improvement standard to CWA $404. Both the ESA 
and CWA permitting programs contain language that is analogous to the 
improvement standard, especially when viewed in light of the overarching, 
proactive objectives of the two statutes. Implementation of ESA § 10 and CWA § 
404, however, does not always yield results that promote overall program goals. 
We therefore conclude in Section V with a discussion of the lessons learned from 
these programs, and some preliminary observations regarding the implementation 
of the improvement standard. 
11. THE IMPROVEMENT STANDARD OF THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER ANNEX 
The Annex defines "improvement" as: 
Additional beneficial, restorative effects to the physical, chemical 
and biological integrity of the Waters and Water-dependent 
natural resources of the basin, resulting from associated 
conservation measures which include, but are not limited to,. . . 
mitigating adverse effects of existing water withdrawals, restoring 
environmentally sensitive areas or implementing conservation 
measures in areas or facilities that are not part of the specific 
proposal undertaken by or on behalf of the ~ i t h d r a w e r . ~ ~  
The phrase "additional beneficial, restorative effects" presumably means that 
to qualify as an "improvement", the required conservation measures must 
provide ecosystem benefits beyond a one to one compensation for the effects of 
the proposed withdrawal. In other words, mitigation that simply preserves the 
status quo or causes "no net loss" as a direct effect of the proposed withdrawal 
will be insuffi~ient.'~ There must be a net gain, measured fiom environmental 
conditions immediately preceding the withdrawal. This presumption about the 
2 3 ~ e e  Congressional Research Service, Wetlands Mitigation Banking: Status and Prospects (1997), 
97-849 ENR (visited Nov. 8,2002) <http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreport~/Wetlands/wet-8.cfin~. 
24 Great Lakes Charter Annex, supra note 10, at 3. 
25" No net loss" is a goal of the CWA 4 404 wetlands program, discussed below, see infra Part iV 
(analyzing 33 U.S.C. 8 1344(b)(1) (2001)). 
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intended baseline from which to measure improvements seems justified because, 
the drafters included a separate "no net loss" 
provision, also in Directive 3, stipulating that there be "no significant adverse 
impacts to the quantity or quality of the waters and water-dependent natural 
,926 
resources. . . . This provision is immediately followed by the improvement 
requirement.27 
111. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) 
President Richard Nixon signed the ESA into law in 1 9 7 3 . ~ ~  The Supreme 
Court has described the ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the 
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."29 Prior federal 
efforts to protect imperiled species had not been successful in preventing species 
 extinction^.^^ The ESA was Congress's decisive sol~t ion.~ '  
A. The Overarching Goals of the ESA 
The plain intent of Congress in enacting the ESA "was to halt and reverse the 
trend toward species extinction, whatever the This desire is reflected not 
only in the stated policies of the Act, but in nearly every section of the statute.33 
The Supreme Court has found that "the omission [from the ESA] of the type of 
qualifying language previously included in endangered species legislation reveals 
a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the 
'primary missions' of federal agencies."34 In other words, the ESA elevates the 
needs of listed species over nearly all other concerns. This ambitious 
overarching objective suggests a parallel between the ESA and the improvement 
standard, in that the maintenance of existing ecological conditions, without more, 
falls short of satisfying the objectives of either. A closer examination of the 
ESA, however, reveals that this analogy is not perfect, particularly when it comes 
to the issuance of Incidental Take Permits (ITPs). 
B. Key Provisions of the ESA 
Three sections of the ESA, operating as part of a single permitting process, 
appear at least somewhat analogous to the improvement standard. Section 9 of 
2 6 ~ r e a t  Lakes Charter Annex, supra note 10, at 2 Directive #3. 
2 7 ~ d .  
'*Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 1973 Pub. Papers 
1027, 1027-28. 
29~ennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1 978). 
30~anie l  J. Rohlf, The Endangered Species Act: A Guide to its Protections and Implementation, 
Stanford Environmental Law Society, 2 1-23 (Stanford 1989). 
31 Tony A. Sullins, Endangered Species Act: Basic Practice Series 2 (2001). 
32 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 699 (1995) 
(citing TYA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184) (emphasis added). 
3 3 ~ d .  
34 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 185. 
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the ESA prohibits the "taking" of listed species.35 Section 10 provides an 
exception to this prohibition under which rivate individuals may obtain an ITP 
as long as they meet certain requirements.' Section 7 prohibits the government 
from issuing ITPs, or engaging in any other federal action, if such action is likely 
to jeopardize the continued survival of listed species in the wild." This part 
examines each of these provisions separately. 
At least one additional ESA provision is arguably comparable to an 
improvement standard, but we ultimately determined that it did not warrant in- 
depth treatment. Section 4 requires recovery plans for listed species, unless the 
Secretary finds that such plans "will not promote the conservation of the 
species."38 Both the adoption and contents of recovery plans are highly 
dis~retionary.~~ Although the ESA directs the agency to "consider the distinct 
needs of separate ecosystems" occupied by the species, most courts view 
recovery plans as guidance documents only, undermining the likelihood of actual 
ecosystem improvement.40 
1. The "Take" Prohibition o f  Section 9 
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the "take" of fish and wildlife species listed as 
"endangered" under the ESA.~' Federal regulation extends this prohibition to 
most species listed as threatened but not endangered.42 "Take", as defined by the 
ESA, means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."43 Among these terms, the 
word "harm" has been given the broadest interpretation and is defined by the 
FWS to include habitat modifications that "significantly [impair] essential 
behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."44 
Regulated parties have argued that the Secretary should limit the purview of 
"harm" to direct applications of force against protected species, and not to 
35 16 U.S.C. g 1538 (a)(l)(B) (1999). 
3616 U.S.C. 5 1539(a)(l)(B) (1999). 
3716 U.S.C. 5 1536(a)(2) (1999). 
3816 U.S.C. tj 1533(f) (1999). A separate provision of 4 4 requires the designation of critical 
habitat for listed species, but its efficacy is limited by an exception from designation when 
economic or other harms outweigh the benefits of designation. See 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(3)(A) (1999). The FWS believes that "critical habitat designation provides little or no conservation 
benefit despite the great cost to put it in place." Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the 
southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed. Reg. 39129, 39131 (1997). 
jgsee Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F.Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1997), affd, 187 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1998); 
Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F.Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992). 
40 See, e.g., Strahan, 967 F.Supp. at 598; Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (1 lth 
Cir.1996). As of 2002, slightly more than half of all listed species had recovery plans, and only a 
handful of species have been removed from the list because of recovery. See FWS, Threatened and 
Endangered Species System(visited Jan. 30,2003) 
~http://ecos.fws.gov/servlet/TESSWebpageDelisted?listings=0>. 
4 1 16 U.S.C. 4 1538 (a)(l)(B). 
42 50 C.F.R. $ 17.3 1(a) (1998). 
43 
44 
16 U.S.C. tj 1532 (19) (1999). 
50 C.F.R. 5 17.3 (1994). 
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activities which adversely affect the species' habitat.45 The Supreme Court, 
however, disagreed: "the dictionary definition [of harm] does not include the 
word 'directly' or suggest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads 
to injury constitutes 'harm."'46 It also found that "the broad purpose of the ESA 
support[ed] the Secretary's decision to extend protection against activities that 
cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid," specifically, 
harms that reduce the likelihood of a listed species surviving in the 
Habitat modifications that cause injury to listed species are therefore prohibited 
by § 9- 
2. Section 10(a): HCPs and ITPs 
In 1982 Congress amended the ESA and added section 10.~' One of the 
purposes of the amendment was to alleviate the potentially draconian effect of $9 
on habitat alteration and development. Section lO(a) gives the Secretary of the 
Interior authority to issue "Incidental Take Permits" ( ITPS) .~~ ITPs are an 
exception to the 5 9 takings prohibition. Once a landowner has determined that a 
take of a listed species is likely to occur during her proposed activity, she may 
apply for an ITP. To obtain a permit, the applicant must develop and submit a 
Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP), which specifies: (1) the likely impact from the 
taking; 2) the steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate the impacts 
to the species; 3) alternative actions considered and the reasons for not choosing 
them; and 4 any other measures the Secretary may require as necessary or 
appropriate.5 2 
After submission of a completed application, and after opportunity for public 
comment, an ITP will be issued if the Secretary finds that: (1) the taking will be 
incidental (i.e., not the purpose of the proposed activity); 2) the applicant will, to 
the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such 
taking; 3) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be 
provided; 4) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival 
and recovery of the species in the wild; and (5) other required measures will be 
met.5' 
3. Section 7(a)(2): Consultation and the "God Squad" 
ESA Section 7(a)(2) requires that federal agencies: 
In consultation with and with the assistance of [NMFS or FWS], 
assure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such 
4 5 ~ e e  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 
47 Id. at 698. 
48 16 U.S.C. 5 1539 (1999). 
4916 U3.C. 5 1539(a)(1) (1999). 
''16 U.S.C. 6 1539(a)(2)(A) (1999). 
5 1 16 U.S.C. 5 1539(a)(2)(B) (1999). 
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agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 
any endangered species or threatened species . . . 52 
Issuance of an ITP under $10 is subject to this consultation requirement 
because it is considered an "action authorized" by a federal agency. The word 
"action" includes "actions intended to conserve listed species . . . [as well as] the 
granting of licenses, contracts, [and] leases."53 The term "Federal agency" means 
"any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United states.''" This 
definition encompasses both FWS and NMFS. To "jeopardize" a species is "to 
engage in an action which reasonably would be expected.. . to reduce 
appreciabl the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of the species in the 
wild. . . 9 7 5  Y 
In the case of ITPs, the FWS is the federal agency, and authorization of the 
permit is the agency action. Therefore, the FWS must consult with itself before 
issuing an ITP to a developer to ensure compliance with the 4 7 consultation 
requirement. This involves a three step process: (1) the agency must determine 
whether listed species reside in the affected area; 2) if there are listed species in 
the affected area, the agency must prepare a biological assessment to determine 
whether the species is likely to be affected by the development; and 3) if so, the 
agency must prepare a Biological Opinion (BO) stating whether or not the 
proposed action will jeopardize the listed species. If the proposed development 
action is expected to jeopardize the listed species, the action may not proceed 
absent an exemption granted by the Endangered Species Committee (ESC) .~~  
The ESC is a panel composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Army, and 
the Interior, as well as the EPA Administrator, the Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and one individual from each affected state.57 This panel is 
referred to as the "God Squad" because of its power to authorize actions likely to 
jeopardize listed species, and perhaps even to result in extinction. Exemptions 
from the 97 no-jeopardy requirement are very rare.58 
Parts of sections 7 and 10 may appear duplicative. For example, § 10's 
requirement that issuance of the ITP not "appreciably reduce the likelihood of the 
survival and recovery of the species in the wild" is almost a restatement of the 
definition of jeopardy: "to engage in an action which reasonably would be 
expected. . . to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and 
,959 
recovery of the species in the wild. . . The agencies have stated that 
5216 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2) (1999) (emphasis added). 
53 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1999). 
54 16 U.S.C. §1532(7) (1999). 
55 50 C.F.R. 4 402.02 (2001). 
5616 U.S.C. 3 1536(a)(2) (1994). 
5716 U.S.C. §1536(e)(3) (1999). 
58 See Sullins, supra note 3 1, at 104. 
59 50 C.F.R. 5 402.02. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, 
Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook, 3-20 (1996). 
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compliance of an HCP with $10 and 97 "should be regarded as a concurrent and 
integrated process . . . not independent and sequential."60 
C. The Improvement Standard as Analogous to the ITP Requirements 
As noted above, $10 requires applicants to submit an HCP that meets certain 
criteria to receive an ITP. These criteria are similar to an improvement standard. 
Although the improvement standard in the Annex explicitly contains the word 
improvement and the HCP criteria do not, for the most part, the two are 
analogous on paper. When it comes to implementation, however, the HCP 
criteria fall short of an improvement, primarily because agency interpretations of 
$10 encourage, but do not require, improvements, and because improvements 
that are required in HCPs do not always materialize as planned. 
1. The Impact of the ITP: Survival versus Recovery 
Section 10 conditions the issuance of ITPs on, among other things, approval 
of a HCP that will "minimize and mitigate" the impacts of the proposed action to 
the "maximum extent practicable."61 This requirement is at least somewhat 
analogous to the Annex's improvement standard, which conditions water 
withdrawals from the Great Lakes on "an improvement to the waters and the 
water dependent resources of the Great Lakes   as in."^^ In comparison to the 
improvement standard, the 10 requirement is less clearly a mandate to produce 
a net environmental gain. ITPs were designed by Congress to authorize 
incidental take and allow development to go forward, not to be mandatory 
recovery tools.63 This does not mean, however, that recovery of listed species is 
not a consideration in HCP design. To the contrary, recovery is an important 
consideration because "a poorly designed HCP could readily trigger the 
'appreciably reduce' or 'jeopardize' standards . . . thus contribution to recovery 
is . . . an integral product of an H C P . " ~ ~  Along these lines, even though FWS and 
NMFS may not mandate that HCPs contribute to the recovery of listed species, 
their HCP Handbook does direct that applicants for ITPs be "encouraged to 
develop HCPs that produce a net positive effect on a species."65 This is 
60~d. at 1-17. The relationship between sections 7 and 10 is explored in Environmental Protection 
Information Center, Inc. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 67 F.Supp.2d 11 13 (N.D. Cal. May 05, 1999), 
vacated in part on other grounds, Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Pacific 
Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071 (9'h Cir. 2001). See id. at 1121 (citing Notice of Availability of Final 
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning, 61 Fed.Reg. 63854, 63856 (1996), which explains 
that "section 7 and its regulations introduce several considerations into the HCP process that are not 
explicitly required by section 10-specifically, indirect effects, effects on federally Iisted plants, 
and effects on critical habitats"). 
61 16 U.S.C. 9 1539 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (1999). 
6 2 ~ r e a t  Lakes Charter Annex, supra note 10, at 3. 
63~ee  U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species 
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook 3-20 (1996). 
64~d. 
65~d. at 1-15. See also Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat 
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35242 (June 1,2000). 
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consistent with the overarching objective of the ESA to "halt and reverse the 
trend toward species e~t inct ion."~~ 
Unfortunately, the goals of the ESA are not always met. The FWS has been 
criticized for holding HCPs to a minimal "prevention of extinction" standard, 
instead of an "enhancement" ~tandard.~' Critics maintain that the FWS demands 
"precious little" by way of mitigation measures when it approves ITPs, and that 
what is "practicable" drives the choice of mitigation measures without re ard for 
whether the mitigation will fully offset the harm allowed by the ITP! Thus, 
while FWS expressly encourages applicants to develop HCPs that will produce a 
net positive effect on listed species, approved HCPs do not always produce such 
an effect. 
2. Mitigation 
Section 10's requirement that an HCP mitigate adverse affects to the 
"maximum extent practicable" indicates that an applicant must prevent and 
minimize harm to a species and its habitat to a high degree, but need only take 
those steps that are economically and technologically feasible. When asked, for 
example, whether its mitigation policy could "call for a recommendation as 
extreme as reflooding the Mississippi Valley," the FWS responded: 
The mitigation policy would not lead to so extreme a 
recommendation because it does not apply to development 
actions completed prior to enactment of service authorities . . . in 
those cases where the policy does apply, there will be no 
recommendations for mitigation over and above the level of 
impacts associated with a project. This policy acts to minimize 
impacts of projects not reverse them.69 
In other words, rather than an improvement standard, it appears that FWS 
66~wee t  Home, 5 15 U.S. at 699 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184). 
6 7 ~ e l i n d a  E. Taylor, Promoting Recovely or Hedging a Bet Against Extinction: Austin Texas' 
Risky Approach To Ensuring Endangered Species Survival in the Texas Hill Country, 24 Envtl. L. 
581 (1994). 
6 8 ~ a v i d  S. Wilcove et. al., Rebuilding the Ark: Toward a More Efleective Endangered Species Act 
for Private Land 11 (Environmental Defense Fund 1996) (visited Jan. 30, 2003) 
<http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/483~Rebuilding%20the%20~k%2Eh~~. 
Along the same lines, the FWS has been criticized for allowing the developer to proceed in the face 
of uncertainty, and for including a "no surprises" or "safe harbor" provision in HCP's, thereby 
providing developers with protection from more onerous provisions in the future. See 50 C.F.R. 8 
17.22(b)(5) (2000); Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat 
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35242 (June 1,2000). 
Professor Dorernus explains that the "no surprises" policy undermines the FWS's ability to change 
or increase an HCP's protective measures in the event that "initial guesses.. . prove too 
optimistic." Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the 
Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 Wash. L.J. 50, 71 (2001). 
69 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Mitigation Policy, 46 Fed.Reg. 7644, 7647 (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
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interprets $10 as a "no net loss" requirement somewhat similar to CWA $404, 
which is discussed below in Section IV.~' 
Permittees who wish to engage in activities that will result in habitat loss often 
mitigate damages caused to listed species by "acquiring or otherwise protecting 
,~71 replacement habitat. . . This is referred to as "habitat mitigation" and is 
acceptable under the HCP process "so lon as such mitigated habitat losses are B consistent with the $10 issuance  riter ria."^ Types of habitat mitigation include: 
acquisition of existing habitat; protection of existing habitat through conservation 
easements or other legal instruments; enhancement or restoration of disturbed 
former habitats; prescriptive management of habitats to achieve specific 
biological characteristics; and creation or' new habitats.73 Different types of 
habitat mitigation are appropriate in different cases. For example, where the 
habitat type takes years to develop (e.g. old-growth forests), acquisition of 
existing high quality habitat may be the best approach. However, the FWS 
acknowledges that "if such habitat is continually being lost, this method alone 
could result in a net loss of habitat value."74 
3. Alternatives and Other Measures 
ESA $ 10 prohibits the Secretary from issuing an ITP to any applicant whose 
HCP fails to specify what "alternative actions" to the taking of listed species 
were considered and the reasons why such alternatives were not utili~ed.~' 
Section 10 also precludes the issuance of an ITP to any applicant whose HCP 
fails to specify such "other measures" that the Secretary requires as being 
necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.76 
The FWS can rely on these two provisions to justify denials of ITPs, but they 
are rarely at issue in the ITP process, and have received little attention. As it 
happens, the majority of cases involving HCPs have been brought by third parties 
to challenge the FWS's approval of an HCP and the subsequent issuance of an 
ITP on the grounds that the HCP's mitigation measures are inadeq~ate.?~ One 
case that did arguably arise out of FWS's denial of an HCP was a regulatory 
takings claim that was dismissed because the landowner had not accepted the 
agency's offers to assist in the design of a satisfactory HCP.'~ The court found 
7 0 ~ e e  infra Section IV (discussing 33 U.S.C. $ 1344). 
7 ' ~ . ~ .  Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species 
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook, 3-20 (1996). 
721d. 
73~d. at 3-22. 
74~d. 
7516 U.S.C. 5 1539 (a)(2)(A)(iii) (1999). 
'5 6 U.S.C. 5 1539 (a)(2)(A)(iv) (1 999). 
77~ee, .g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (M.D. 
Fla. 2000); Nat'I Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000); Sierra Club v. 
Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (S.D. Ala. 1998); Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 
976 (9" Cir. 1985). 
78~ee  Seiber v. United States, 53 Fed. C1. 570 (2002) (relying in large part on Boise Cascade Corp. 
v. Board of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1999), a case with similar facts but that involved a 
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the agency action was not final, and the dispute was therefore not ripe.79 
D. Judicial Challenges to HCPs 
There have not been many legal challenges to habitat conservation planning 
in general or to individual HCPS.'' The few cases that have been brought 
illustrate how the ITP mitigation requirements, while analogous to the 
improvement standard on paper, may fall short of a net ecological gain when they 
are implemented. Nonetheless, courts are highly deferential to FWS's 
conclusions in the adoption of an HCP, and typically uphold HCP's so long as 
the agency provides an adequate administrative record to support its decision. 
In the first of these cases, the Ninth Circuit upheld an ITP authorizing the 
"taking" of Mission Blue Butterflies in an area where the permittees wished to 
construct residential housing.'' The plaintiff, an environmental group, alleged 
that FWS violated both $10 and 97 of the ESA in issuing the ITP.~ According to 
the plaintiff, FWS violated §lO(a) by not meeting the required mitigation 
requirements. FWS argued that the mitigation requirements were satisfied 
because the HCP would actually enhance the survival of the Mission Blue 
~ u t t e r f l ~ . ' ~  The FWS's argument was based in part on the HCP's commitment to 
combat encroachment of the invasive juniper brush into the butterfly's grassland 
habitat, a problem that a prior study predicted would cause extinction of the 
species even in the absence of human development on the land.84 
The plaintiff also argued FWS failed to satisfy a provision of §7 that requires 
agencies to "use the best scientific and commercial data available" during the 
consultation process.85 FWS responded that the data, though concededly derived 
from methods inherently resulting in a high level of uncertainty, represented the 
best data ava i l ab~e .~~  The court applied the narrow "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard of review, under which FWS's issuance of the ITP would be upheld so 
long as FWS had "considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made."" As a result, the court 
upheld the agency's decision to issue the ITP.'' 
In a more recent case, an environmental group initiated a lawsuit against then- 
Secretary Babbitt for allegedly violating the ESA by granting an ITP to the 
landowner that had not submitted an HCP). 
7 9 ~ d .  
80 Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a Framework for 
Empirical Analysis. 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 33, 60-61 (2002). 
8 1 Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (gfh Cir. 1985). 
82 Id. at 981, 983. 
831d. at 982. 
841d. at 979. 
85 
86 
16 U.S.C. 8 1536(a)(2) (1994). 
Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 979. 
87 Id. at 981 (citing Baltimore Gas and Electric Company v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983)). 
881d. at 98 1, 988. 
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County of Volusia, ~ l o r i d a . ~ ~  The county used the permit to build lights along a 
beach that was a nesting ground for threatened sea turtles. When baby sea turtles 
hatched many of them instinctively followed the artificial light instead of the 
moonlight and never made it to sea.90 The county also allowed vehicular traffic 
on the beach, which resulted in garbage and tire ruts, and "generally disturbied] 
the natural condition of the beach and its sand."91 
FWS argued in part: 
The total extent of sea turtle nesting on all of Volusia County's 
beaches accounts for 2.8 percent of all loggerhead, 3 percent of 
all green, and less than 1 percent of all leatherback. . . . 
Volusia's coastline is not considered essential nesting area for 
any of the species at issue . . . [and ] the total number of turtle 
nests found in the County are insi nificant in relation to the 
recovery and survival of the species. 9 5  
The court agreed that granting the ITP was proper because the HCP contained 
"minimizing" factors such as diminishing the total beach area over which 
vehicles were allowed to travel, reducing times of day when vehicles were 
allowed on the beach, and restricting commercial fishermen and 
 concessionaire^.^^ The court also approved the HCP's attempt to "mitigate" the 
adverse impacts on the turtles by incorporating a Beach Lighting Management 
This involved modifying all county-controlled lights if necessary to bring 
them into compliance with guidelines established by the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection (FDEP); agreeing to come up with a plan to correct 
lights not owned by the county; and increasing enforcement efforts for the 
Volusia County Lighting ~ r d i n a n c e . ~ ~  The court found that these factors 
satisfied the "maximum extent practicable" mitigation standard of $ It 
ultimately concluded that the ITP was not arbitrary and capricious due largely to 
the "insignificant" number of affected turtles and the FWS's assertion that 
"closing the beaches entirely during the spring and summer months was patently 
impracticable" because of the serious economic and community impacts that any 
reduction in beach usage would have in the ~ o u n t y . ~ '  
These cases indicate that courts are highly deferential to agency determinations 
"~oggerhead Turtle v. the County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 120 F. Supp. 2d. 1005 
(M.D. Fla. 2000). 
90 Id. at 1008. 
91~d. 
92~d. at 1015. 
931d. at 1020. 
94 Id. 
951d. at 1015. 
96~d. at 1020. 
9'1d. 
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that an HCP has satisfied $10 and 97. They also suggest that the "best scientific 
data" upon which the agency bases a 8 7 no-jeopardy opinion may yield results 
with a high degree of uncertainty, and thus impede the agency's ability to 
accurately predict the impact of a proposed HCP. Finally, the maximum extent 
of mitigation that an agency considers "practicable" in light of economic 
considerations may amount to a net reduction in habitat value as measured from 
the ecological baseline, rather than improvement. 
E. Political influences on the ITP Permitting Process 
Social factors can have a pervasive influence on the ITP permitting process, in 
addition to, or perhaps in spite of, the legal requirements addressed above. In 
particular, political forces play a significant role in ESA implementation and can 
diminish its efficacy, particularly in the ITP context. 
Only 14 ITPs were issued between 1982 and 1992, but 193 were issued 
between 1994 and 1997.~' Possible reasons for the dramatic increase in the 
number of ITPs issued during the mid-1990s include proposals by the 104' 
Congress to amend the ESA, a relatively conservative Supreme Court, judicial 
decisions limiting Congress's Commerce Clause powers, and the risk to the 
federal government resented by Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims by W private landowners. As for the last item, successful claims could require the 
United States to pay just compensation to the landowner and establish adverse 
precedent with nationwide  ramification^.'^^ 
A leading example involves Charles Hunvitz, the chairman of the Houston 
company Maxxam. Hunvitz sued the FWS in 1996, claiming that logging 
restrictions stemming from the ESA amounted to a regulatory taking of property 
owned by the Pacific Logging Company (a Maxxam company).'0' The land in 
question was occupied by at least two listed species, the marbled murrelet and the 
coho salmon. The takings issue was never resolved and the case was ultimately 
settled out of court, with the public paying $492 million to purchase 10,071 acres 
of California Redwoods owned by Pacific Lumber, and the company agreeing to 
an HCP covering all of the forest that it still owned (approximately 21 1,000 
acres).lo2 Under the terms of the plan and ITP, the company would be allowed to 
9 8 ~ h i - ~ i n g  Hsu, The Potential and Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the ESA, 29 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10592, 10594 (1999). 
99 Id. Professor Pat Parenteau describes the increased use of HCP's in the mid-1990's, and the "no 
surprises" policy incorporated in the HCP process, as a strategy "cooked up by people under stress 
from the mindless Contract with America. . . Something had to be done to stave off a full-scale 
attack on the Endangered Species Act" by Representative Newt Gingrich and others in Congress. 
See Jon Margolis, Critics Say 'No Surprises' Means No Protection, High Country News (Aug. 4, 
1997) (visited Feb. 4,2003) <http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?a~icle~id=3481~. 
'"u.s. Const. Amend. V. 
'"~aul Rogers, Deal Saves Ancient Trees; Papers Filed Two Minutes Before Midnight Deadline, 
San Jose Mercury News (March 2, 1999). For environmental groups' challenges to the Hurwitz 
ITP, see, e.g., Environmental Protection Infirnation Center, 67 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 
1999). 
'02~ogers, supra note 101. 
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cut no more than 179 million board feet a year, 31 million less than what the 
company had planned. lo3 
Under different political circumstances, the government may have opted for a 
trial rather than a settlement in the Hurwitz case. In other words, FWS could 
have proceeded with a vigorous enforcement action under ESA 9 to deter 
Hunvitz from logging, and taken its chances with respect to Hunvitz's Fifth 
Amendment claim. Instead, it responded to the private landowner's regulatory 
takings claim with the approval of a 50-year HCP and the purchase of a 
substantial tract of forest-land from Pacific ~urnber . "~  Some scholars have 
argued that FWS was unwilling to gamble in a lawsuit against Hunvitz because a 
loss would set an adverse precedent and "significantly constrain the services' 
future ability to regulate land use to protect listed species."105 
It is difficult to say whether the above HCP constitutes an unnecessary 
compromise and over-concession on the part of the FWS or whether it amounts 
to an improvement for murrelet and salmon habitat. The answer depends on 
several unknown factors: (1) whether Hurwitz would have prevailed in his 
regulatory takings claim had it gone to trial; (2) if not, whether he would have 
logged the land in spite of the ESA restrictions; (3) whether unauthorized 9 
takings would have occurred during the logging; and (4) whether the FWS would 
have prevailed in a subsequent enforcement claim against Hunvitz. 
If Hunvitz would have prevailed in his defense of a government enforcement 
action, it seems reasonable to describe the HCP and the land purchase as 
improvements over the probable alternative: a precedent-setting Supreme Court 
decision saying that environmental restrictions on private land amount to 
regulatory takings requiring just compensation. Hunvitz and other private 
landowners would then have much less to fear from the enforcement provisions 
of the ESA, and an increase in the frequency of unauthorized §9 takings could 
reasonably be expected to occur. The actual outcome in the Hunvitz case could 
therefore be called an overall improvement over the probable alternative, but it 
appears to be a net loss when viewed strictly from the perspective of listed 
species, and thus does not constitute an ecological improvement as the term is 
used in the Annex. 
IV. SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
The purpose of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") is to "restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 9, 106 CWA § 
4041°7 promotes water quality and overall hydrological integrity by prohibiting 
the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters, including certain 
lo31d. 
lo41d. 
'O5shi-l in^ Hsu, supra note 80, at 60-61. 
106 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a) (2001). 
"'33 U.S.C. 5 1344 (2001). 
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wetlands, unless authorized by a CWA permit.'08 
This section of the analysis provides an overview of the permit process under 
CWA Section 404 and the mitigation requirements necessary to receive a permit. 
The compensatory mitigation requirements, which often require enhancement or 
creation of wetlands, are roughly analogous to the "improvement" standard in the 
Great Lakes. Like the ITP requirements of the ESA, however, CWA 8 404 falls 
short of the mark in implementation. 
A. Obtaining a Permit Under Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act 
Section 404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Amy,  acting 
through the chief of the Corps of Engineers, to issue permits after notice and 
public hearings "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable 
waters at specified disposal sites."109 Navigable waters are defined broadly, and 
include certain marshy areas and other  wetland^."^ Individual permits are 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and require completion of a multi-step 
process."1 Although the statute itself is silent on the specific permitting 
requirements, regulatory guidelines have been developed by the Corps and the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."' 
A three-step sequence of steps is required to obtain a permit: avoidance; 
minimization; and compensatory mitigation. These steps are detailed in the 
Corps-EPA Mitigation Memorandum of Agreement (Mitigation MOA)."' Tq 
receive a permit, the first step a party must take is to demonstrate that there are 
no practical alternatives to the destruction of wetlands, and the least 
environmentally damaging alternative will be used."4 The regulatory agencies 
will presume there is a practical alternative if the project is not water 
dependent.Il5 Second, appropriate and practical steps must be taken to minimize 
the adverse effects of the development on the  wetland^."^ Finally, if there is 
damage to the wetlands that cannot be avoided or minimized, the permittee is 
required to compensate for the damages.Il7 
1. The "No Practical Alternative" Requirement: Avoiding and Minimizing 
lo81d. See 33 U.S.C. $ 131 l(a)(2001) (prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters 
without a permit). 
Io933 U.S.C. 5 1344(a) (2001). 
110 33 C.F.R. 5 329.3 (2003); see generally U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 
123-25 (1985). 
I l l  40 C.F.R. pt. 230. 
I1*1d. at $230.10. 
113 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department 
of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 
404(b)(l) Guidelines, 55 Fed, Reg. 9210,9212 (Mar. 12, 1990) (hereinafter Mitigation MOA). 
114 See 40 C.F.R. $ 230.10(a); Mitigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212. 
'"40 C.F.R 5 230.10(a)(3). 
l161d. at $230.10(d). 
117 . .  Mltlgation MOA, supra note 1 13, at 92 12. 
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Damage 
The discharge of dredge or fill material is prohibited if there is a practicable 
alternative that would have less of an impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as 
the alternative does not have other considerable adverse environmental 
~onse~uences . ' ' ~  An example of an alternative is if the project can be moved to 
an area that does not affect wetlands, such as creating a golf course on higher 
ground rather than developing the  wetland^."^ That alternative would be 
considered practicable if it is available and capable of being done after taking 
into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall 
project purposes."'20 If the project in question is not water-dependent, it will be 
assumed that an alternative is available "unless clearly demonstrated 
otherwise."'*' 
Finding a practical alternative is, without doubt, the best way to avoid adverse 
impacts on wetlands. If no practicable alternative is found, however, wetlands 
may be developed, but only if "appropriate and practicable steps have been taken 
which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic 
ecosystem."'22 Before obtaining a permit one must avoid or minimize damage to 
the water, plants and animals in the affected wetlands area.'23 
"'40 C.F.R. 9 230.10(a). 
'I9see Bersani v. U.S. E.P.A., 850 F.2d 36,42-44 (2d Cir. 1988) (A developers request for a permit 
to put a shopping mall on wetlands was denied because of the availability of more practical 
alternatives) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989). 
l2O40 C.F.R. $230.10(a)(2). 
12'40 C.F.R. 4 230.10(a)(3). The developer must show that no other property could "reasonably" be 
obtained to hlfill the "basic purpose of the proposed activity." Bersani, 850 F.2d at 44 (affirming 
EPA's veto of a Section 404 permit on the grounds that the developer had failed to prove that there 
was no alternative to its proposal to build a shopping mall in a wetlands area, when there were 
other suitable properties available for purchase at the time the developer entered the real estate 
market); National Wildlife Federation v. Whistler, 27 F.3d 1341 (8'h Cir. 1994) (upholding the 
issuance of a permit for a "water dependent" project where the project's purpose was defined as 
r v i d i n g  boat access for a housing development). 
22 40 C.F.R. 9 230.10(d). 
'2340 C.F.R. 6 230.75. The minimization of adverse effects on populations of plants and animals 
can be achieved by: 
(a) Avoiding changes in water current and circulation patterns which would interfere with 
the movement of animals; 
(b) Selecting sites or managing discharges to avoid creating habitat conducive to the 
development of undesirable predators or species which have a competitive edge over 
indigenous plants or animals; 
(c) Avoiding sites having unique values, including threatened or endangered species 
habitat: 
(d) Using planning and construction practices to institute habitat development and 
restoration to produce a new or modified environmental state of higher ecological 
value; 
(e) Timing discharge to avoid spawning or migration seasons and other biologically 
critical time periods; and 
(f) Avoiding the destruction of remnant natural sites within areas already affected by 
development. 
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2. The Compensatory Mitigation Requirement 
The Mitigation MOA provides guidance for compensatory mitigation. It 
expresses a preference for on-site mitigation as well as in-kind mitigation.12' The 
Mitigation MOA favors restoration and enhancement, rather than creation or 
preservation, as acceptable forms of compensatory mitigation.125 The Mitigation 
MOA also approves mitigation banking as an option for compensatory 
mitigation.lZ6 
To obtain a permit, a party must submit compensatory mitigation Ians that 
promise future enhancement, restoration, or creation of wetlands." These 
objectives should promote improvement of wetlands habitat. Implementation 
experience, however, has not been encouraging. A recent report by the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences concludes that mitigation 
plans are often unsuccessful largely because developers fail to follow through 
with the plans to mitigate and regulators are often unable or unwilling to track 
permits to make certain that developers are meeting their promises and to punish 
those who do not.128 
A study conducted by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation 
(FDER) provides detailed evidence of the deficiencies of compensatory plans.'29 
The study was ordered by the Florida legislature in 1990 to assess the effect of 
mitigation projects within the state.l3' The FDER evaluated sixty-three permits 
that required wetland creation as mitigation for wetland impacts between 1985 
and 1990.'~' The FDER's study revealed a soaring rate of noncompliance. Of 
the parties with permits that were required to mitigate, only four (6.3%) had 
complied with their mitigation requirements.132 The study also found that thirty- 
four percent of parties with permits failed to begin their creation projects before 
124~itigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212. 
125~d .  
126~itigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212. See 1995 Federal Guidance for the Establishment, 
Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (Nov. 28, 1995); J.B. Ruhl and R. 
Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands 
Mitigation Banking, 20 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 365, 372 (2001). 
127 Mitigation MOA, supra note 113, at 9212; Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 636 (6th Cir. 
1997) (citing cases where courts have held that it is not necessary to have a final, detailed 
mitigation plan in place prior to approval of a 5 404 permit; instead, it is acceptable for the Corps to 
a rove a permit conditioned on future implementation of a mitigation plan). 
I f? See National Research Council, Committee on Mitigating Wetland Losses, Board on 
Environmental Studies and Toxicology - Water Science and Technology Board, Compensating for 
Wetland Losses under the Clean Water Act (2001) (hereinafter National Research Council); See 
also U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Wetlands: The Corps of Engineers' Administration of the Section 404 
Program 55-73 (1 988) (finding that Corps and EPA enforcement efforts are not effective). 
129 Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 
Iowa L. Rev. 527, 540 (1996) (citing Florida Dep't of Envtl. Reg., Report on the Effectiveness of 
Permitted Mitigation Sites (Mar. 199 1) [hereinafter FDER]). 
I3O~la. Stat. Ann. §403.918(2)(b) (West 1994). 
" '~ardner,  supra note 129, at 540. 
132 Id. 
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impacting the ~ e t 1 a n d s . l ~ ~  
The FDER recommended enhancement of degraded wetlands or restoration of 
former wetlands when compensatory mitigation is to be used.134 If enhancement 
or restoration is not possible, preservation may be successful if used in 
combination with other mitigation  measure^.'^' Finally, wetland creation should 
be used when it is the only remaining option.136 
The EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) also reported dismal 
outcomes in their 1994 assessment of seventeen creation and restoration sites in 
the state of washington.13" The EPA and FWS found that two of the seventeen 
developers did not even begin the required compensatory mitigation, eleven sites 
(65%) were not at the required level of ecological fim~tion,'~%nd only four 
mitigation sites (24%) were functioning we11.I3' 
The EPA and FWS report concluded that the failure of the mitigation sites was 
not necessarily due to the inadequate science of wetland restoration and 
creation.140 Instead, success depended largely on human and economic factors. 
More specifically, human factors such as "commitment to plan, implement, 
monitor, adjust, and maintain mitigation"14' play a pivotal role in the success of 
compensatory mitigation, as does having the financial resources and regulatory 
incentive to access competent technical expertise. The regulatory bodies have 
been criticized for allowing the "most simple and expedient" approach, which 
usually turns on fixed ratios between wetlands lost and wetlands restored rather 
than a sophisticated evaluation of wetland functions and v a 1 ~ e s . I ~ ~  In addition, 
the EPA and FWS acknowledged that some of the failures of the developers were 
due to poor enforcement efforts.'43 
Failure of the Corps to enforce the 404 guidelines has had ,devastating impacts 
on wetlands. The Corps often only requires a mitigation plan to obtain a permit, 
and fails to monitor the site to see if the mitigation requirements are meet.144 
Without the Corps' watchful eye, developers fail to initiate or follow through 
with the mitigation plans.'45 Even if the sites were carefully monitored, in most 
cases there is no pre-designated party responsible for correcting the failure to 
133 Id. 
134~d. at 54i.  
1351d. 
1361d. 
I3'Id. (citing U.S. E.P.A. and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Interagency Follow-Through 
Investigation of Compensatory Wetland Mitigation Sites (May 1994)). 
13*1d. 
139 Id. 
l4OId. 
141 Id. 
14=~uhl,  supra note 126, at 379. 
' 4 3 ~ e e  Gardner, supra note 129, at 540; National Research Council, supra note 128. 
'44~onathan Silverstein, Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a 
Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 129, 133 (1994). 
145~d. at 133. 
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comply with the compensatory mitigation plan.146 Developers have not been held 
responsible for long-term monitoring or maintaining the mitigation sites to ensure 
they are successful in the future.147 
A more recent report by the Indiana Department of Environmental 
Management (IDEM) confirms the deficiencies of compensatory mitigation in 
the Great Lakes region.'48 The Indiana Wetland Compensatoly Mitigation: 
Inventory addressed compliance with mitigation projects primarily in the 
northern part of Indiana, with clusters around Lake Michigan, Fort Wayne, and 
~ n d i a n a ~ o l i s . ' ~ ~  Thirty-seven percent of the 345 mitigation sites were in 
watersheds that feed into Lake Michigan and Lake ~rie. '"  Of the 345 sites, 214 
(62%) had been constructed, 70 (20%) were incomplete, 49 (14%) had failed to 
initiate compensatory mitigation, and 12 (3%) did not have sufficient information 
to be e~aluated. '~ '  Of the mitigation sites that were not constructed, many of the 
parties responsible for mitigation had completely ignored the requirements, while 
other parties began mitigation but failed to complete the required project.'52 
The consensus is that compensatory mitigation is a proven failure when under- 
taken by the developers after their permit has been issued. Studies spanning over 
a decade of experience by state departments and federal agencies depict 
discouraging statistics regarding failure rates, which ultimately translate into a 
damaged ecosystem. The dismal track record should serve as a cautionary lesson 
for the Great Lakes community as it moves forward with implementation of the 
Annex. 
B. Mitigation Banking 
To counter the failures of on-site compensatory mitigation, mitigation banks 
have been developed. Mitigation bankin is a process where wetland sites are f held in reserve as the mitigation "bank".' Mitigation bankers can earn credits 
for restoration, creation or enhancing the wetland "bank," and developers can 
buy the credits from the mitigation bankers.Is4 
The use of a banking approach allows the applicant to purchase "improvement 
credits" in advance, before the environmentally degrading activity is conducted. 
Wetlands mitigation banks have been reIatively successful in ensuring that there 
1 4 6 ~ d .  
147 Id. 
'48~ndiana Deplt of Envtl. Management, Section 401 Water Quality Certification Program, Wetland 
Compensatory Mitigation Study, ~http://www.state.in.us/idemlowm/planbr/wqs/mitigation 
monitoring.htm> (visited October 22,2002) (copy on file with author) (The study did not address 
the success or function of these mitigation sites). 
149 Id. at 2. 
1 5 0 ~ d .  at 10. 
I5'!d. at 2. 
15*1d. at 7. 
153 Jennifer Neal, Paving the Road to Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 16 1 
(1999). 
is4 ' Gardner, supra note 129, at 552-553. 
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is "no net loss" of total wetland area.155 The downside, however, is that 
functional, unique wetlands are allowed to be destroyed as long as a developer 
buys wetland credits from a mitigation bank, some of which are located in totally 
different  watershed^.'^^ Moreover, there is no assurance that the "banked" 
wetlands are the functional equivalent or provide the same ecosystem values and 
services as those that are lost to de~e lopment . '~~  
The mitigation banking experience demonstrates that there is greater potential 
for success if governmental agencies are involved in certifying the banks as true 
"improvements," using ecologically sound, quantifiable criteria, in advance of 
development, instead of leaving the burden on the permittees to effectuate 
mitigation requirements after the fact. A vital element of an effective banking 
system is that parties cannot count on "credits" that have not yet been earned, 
which means that the improvement, enhancement or restoration must be 
completed before wetlands are destroyed or water is allowed to be ~ i t h d r a w n . ' ~ ~  
Selling "improvement credits" in the form of established banks can greatly 
increase the ecological success of the program because measurable improvement 
must have already occurred before the permit may issue. If mitigation banking 
were adopted as a means of securing an improvement to waters and water- 
dependent resources in the Great Lakes basin, these issues must be addressed to 
ensure successful implementation of the Annex 200 1 standard. 
Annex 2001 states that proposals to withdraw water from the Great Lakes must 
not only prevent or minimize water loss, avoid adverse effects on water quantity 
or quality and comply with state and federal laws, but they must also improve the 
waters and natural resources of the Basin. Thus, like ESA 9 10 and CWA 8 404, 
Annex 2001 requires minimization of adverse ecological effects, but it goes 
beyond existing regulatory programs to require resource improvement. This is an 
innovative and proactive standard, in keeping with the status of the Great Lakes 
155cc No net loss" has been a long-standing goal of the wetlands program. See National Wetlands 
Mitigation Action Plan (Dec. 27,2002) (visited April 1,2003). 
<http:Nwww.epa.govlowowlwetlands/guidancemap1226withsign.pdD. It is intended to ensure that 
there is no net loss in quantity of total wetlands area. See Mitigation MOA, supra note 113. 
156~awrence R. Liebesmana and David M. Plott, The Emergence of private Wetlands Mitigation 
Banking, 13 NR & E 341, 343 (1998); Michael C. Blumm, The Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net 
Gain in Wetlands Protection, J .  Land Use & Env. L. 203, 227-28 (1994). Although the agencies 
have adopted a policy that banks should be in the same geographic area as the wetlands lost to 
development, the use of a bank in adjacent areas may be allowed "when practicable and 
environmentally desirable." Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of 
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,611 (1995). The National Research Council 
recommends that "site selection for wetland conservation and mitigation should be conducted on a 
watershed scale in order to maintain wetland diversity and to enhance the long-run viability of 
wetland and riparian systems." National Research Council, supra note 128. 
'*'see Ruhl, supra note 126, at 379, 387-89 (noting that the assessment of wetlands hnction has 
not improved significantly over the past decade). The banking program may result in an excess of 
certain types of wetlands because they are easier and cheaper to create than others. 
15?',See National Research Council, supra note 128. 
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aquatic ecosystem as the world's largest freshwater source. 
The CWA and ESA are two of our nation's premiere environmental laws, and 
they have done a great deal to protect water quality and imperiled species. Yet 
they come short of requiring actual, long-term ecosystem improvement. The 
CWA 5 404 program fails to adequately monitor and enforce the developer's 
promises to mitigate wetland losses. Meanwhile, the ESA requires that HCPs 
include only those mitigation measures that are "practicable" in light of 
economic considerations, often resulting in a net reduction in habitat values. 
Moreover, the FWS has only limited ability to predict the impact of a proposed 
HCP over time and to adjust HCP requirements to reflect changes in 
environmental conditions or the needs of species. 
Years of experience in implementing the CWA and ESA permitting programs 
provide the following insights regarding Annex 2001. First, actual, measurable 
improvement should be required before the removal of water occurs. Monitoring 
will still be necessary to ensure that the effects of the project are as anticipated, 
and that the improvement "banks" or other measures continue to function. The 
inability to enforce measures adopted as improvements, or to follow through with 
comprehensive monitoring requirements, could have devastating impacts on the 
Great Lakes. In addition, specific technical and legal requirements must be 
established to refine the improvement standard and guide the decisionmakers 
who must implement it. The standard should be based on ecosystem values and 
services rather than mere quantity or net replacement ratios. Last but not least, 
Great Lakes authorities must provide sufficient incentives and funds to ensure 
that technical expertise is developed and made available to regulators and the 
regulated community. The improvement standard of Annex 2001 will, no doubt, 
prove to be a challenging standard for all concerned, but one that is well worth 
meeting. 
